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Abstract
We address the problem of reverse engineering of stripped executables which
contain no debug information. This is a challenging problem because of the low
amount of syntactic information available in stripped executables, and due to the
diverse assembly code patterns arising from compiler optimizations. We present
a novel approach for predicting procedure names in stripped executables. Our
approach combines static analysis with encoder-decoder-based models. The main
idea is to use static analysis to obtain enriched representations of API call sites;
encode a set of sequences of these call sites by traversing the Control-Flow Graph;
and finally, attend to the encoded sequences while decoding the target name. Our
evaluation shows that our model performs predictions that are difficult and time
consuming for humans, while improving on the state-of-the-art by 20%.
1 Introduction
Reverse Engineering (RE) of compiled binary executables has a variety of applications. Furthermore,
it is crucial for analyzing malware and finding vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, it is a tedious and time
consuming task. A human reverse-engineer has to guess the procedures to begin with; follow the
flow in these procedures; find connections between procedures; and finally piece all these together
to develop a global understanding of the purpose and usage of the inspected executable.
Recently, there has been a lot of work on analysis of source code using learned models (Raychev
et al., 2015; Bielik et al., 2016; Allamanis et al., 2018; Alon et al., 2019a; Murali et al., 2017;
Brockschmidt et al., 2019; Yin and Neubig, 2017; Chen et al., 2018). However, all of these address
high-level and syntactically rich programming languages such as Java, C# and Python, and none of
them address the unique challenges residing in executables. He et al. (2018) proposed a non-neural
model for reasoning about binaries, but the model suffered from inherent sparsity.
We present a novel approach for reasoning about compiled assembly code. Specifically, we use
static analysis to locate and analyze external API calls; we traverse the Control-Flow Graph (CFG) to
approximate the dynamic runtime order of the calls; and finally, we decode the caller procedure name
while attending to potential runtime sequences. Our approach provides an interesting and powerful
balance between the program analysis effort required to obtain the representation from executables
and the effectiveness of the learning model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
leverage deep learning for recovering procedure names in binary code.
We compare our approach empirically with previous work which used shallow static analysis with
non-neural models. Moreover, we show that training Neural Machine Translation (NMT) baselines
on the flat assembly code performs poorly – this necessitates leveraging semantic analysis to learn
from executables. We ablate our model to demonstrate the importance of the different components
of our analysis to the quality of the representation. We show that our combined approach of static
analysis to enrich neural representations yields more accurate results than previous work and presents
a major step in the field of neural reverse engineering.
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: (a) Given assembly code of an executable, (b) we reconstruct calls to external APIs and
deduce their argument kinds; (c) these external calls are placed in the reconstructed Control-Flow
Graph which approximates their runtime call order; (d) our model learns all potential runtime call
orders; and (e) the decoder generates the target name while attending to all potential call orders.
2 Enriched Representations for Binary Call Sites
2.1 Task: Reverse Engineering as Generation of Binary Procedure Names
Assembly code from a stripped executable is a sequence of instructions lacking variable names (see,
for example, the disassembled block in Figure 1(a)). Learning such a low-level stripped representation
is a challenging task. A naïve approach where the sequence of instructions is fed into a seq2seq
architecture (Luong et al., 2015; Sutskever et al., 2014; Cho et al., 2014) yields hopelessly imprecise
results (as we show in Section 5).
Given a nameless assembly procedure X residing in a stripped (containing no debug information)
executable, our goal is to predict a likely and descriptive name Y = y1..., ym, where y1..., ym are the
subtokens composing Y. Thus, our goal is to model P (Y | X). For example, for the name Y =
create_server_socket, the subtokens y1..., ym that we aim to predict are create, server and
socket, respectively (Figure 1(e)).
2.2 Overview
We draw our initial intuition from the way a human reverse engineer skims the code of an unknown
procedure P, stripped from debug symbols. Disassembling the code of P from hexadecimal values
into assembly instructions results in a flow of instructions such as the ones shown in Figure 1(a). To
understand what an assembly code snippet does, the most informative pieces of information are calls
to procedures that were dynamically linked to the examined executable, e.g., call getaddrinfo
(line 8) and call setsockopt (line 17) in Figure 1(a). The API names getaddrinfo and
setsockopt cannot be stripped without breaking the loading process; stripping them would leave
the executable unusable. Similarly, if the examined executable is a library, procedures exported by
the library cannot be stripped either.
To reason about compiled binaries, we need to: (i) encode each API call while capturing as much
semantic information as available; and (ii) learn all API calls in a way that reflects the relationship
between them. To encode API calls ((i)), we perform a static analysis that reconstructs information
regarding the values, types and origin of the argument passed to the called API (Figure 1(b)). To
learn the relationship between multiple encoded API calls ((ii)), we reconstruct and traverse the
Control-Flow Graph (CFG) of the procedure (Figure 1(c)). Reconstruction of CFG allows to observe
the potential chronological order in which the APIs are used, rather than the random order in which
they appear in the executable. By observing the API calls in the order they appear in the CFG,
we approximate the order in which the APIs may be used in runtime, without actually running the
procedure. The alternative of observing the calls in the order they appear in the assembly loses
their functional order, because the assembly order is arbitrary. The alternative of dynamic analysis –
actually running the executable and observing its behavior – is difficult and security-wise dangerous
when dealing with unknown executables; additionally, dynamic analysis cannot guarantee sufficient
coverage of the code. Finally, our decoder generates the target procedure name while attending to all
potential runtime call orders (Figure 1(d)). In this example, our model predicted the name create
server socket (Figure 1(e)).
2
2.3 Reconstructing call sites
First, we analyze each external call instruction to gather all available semantic information. We
examine debug symbols for libraries used by the given executable to retrieve the number of arguments
passed to each procedure. We map each argument to the register used to pass it, and construct a call
site that is very similar to a call site in higher-level languages, as shown in Fig. 1(b), where each API
name is matched with the registers it takes their values as arguments.
To gather more information from each call site, we also analyze each of the values passed as
arguments. This information can be gathered only by analyzing the calls in the context of the entire
procedure. To gather this information, we compute a static slice of each register at the call location
in the procedure. A slice of a program (Weiser, 1984) at a specific location for a specific value is a
subset of the instructions in the program necessary to create the value at this specific location. Each
register of a call site in Figure 1(b) is connected by an arrow to the slice of P used to create its value:
for example, the value of rsi for the setsockopt call 1Owas created by an assignment of a constant
value of 1. In some other cases, the value of a specific register is unknown. One such case is the
value of rdi passed to setsockopt 2O, which is the result of call to the socket procedure. Another
such case is that of the values of rdx and rcx used in getaddrinfo 3O which are just pointers to
structures allocated on the stack.
Using Pointer-Aware Slicing to Determine Kinds Even when the value of a register is unknown, it
is informative to know the kind of its value. The kind provides the model with more information
about how an API is used than the arbitrary name of the register. We perform a pointer-aware static
program slice, and adapt the definition of Lyle and Binkley (1993) to assembly instructions. We
generate slice information according to the specifications of the CPU manufacturer, e.g., Intel x64.
We analyze each argument register slice and mark it as one of five categories: received as argument
(ARG), locally created value (VAL), global value (GLOBAL), and unknown constant value (CONST).
When a specific value can be extracted, e.g., the number “1”, it is used as-is without a category. We
call these categories argument kinds. For example, marking argument kinds for the two procedure
calls in Figure 1(b) results in getaddrinfo(ARG,ARG,CONST,CONST) and setsockopt(VAL,1,2,CONST,4).
Example Consider the longest path of Figure 1(d) – with edges marked as
(1, 3, 5, 7, 8): (i) memset(CONST,0,48) initializes a 48-byte memory space with ze-
roes; (ii) getaddrinfo(ARG,ARG,CONST,CONST) gathers required system information and stores
the results in the previously initialized memory; (iii) socket(CONST, CONST,CONST) and
setsocketopt(VAL,1,2,CONST,4) create a socket and configure it to be a TCP socket by passing
the value 1; and (iv) bind and listen determine that this procedure is part of a server listening to
incoming connections. The rest of the calls handle errors (strerror) and free created resources
(close and freeaddrinfo).
This representation makes it easier to reason about the procedure both for a learning model and a
human reverse engineer. In Section 5.3 we show that argument kinds improve the results of our
model by 4% relative over the alternative of using only the name of the external API.
3 Representing Binary Procedures as Sets of Call Site Sequences
A key observation in this work is that focusing on call sites is useful for representing binary
procedures. However, using the arbitrary order of calls in which they appear in the binary fails
to capture their regularity. After reconstructing call sites, we examine the order these calls are
used. Figure 1(c) shows the CFG containing only the call sites. This CFG contains four top-down
sequences, with edges marked as: (1, 2), (1, 3, 4), (1, 3, 5, 6), and (1, 3, 5, 7, 8). Figure 1(d) shows
these sequences separately.
Analyzing the CFG of the procedure Given a binary procedure composed of basic blocks, we
construct the CFG of the procedure GP . A CFG is a directed graph comprised of nodes which
correspond to the basic blocks in P. These nodes are connected by edges according to control-flow
instructions, i.e., jumps between basic blocks. To simplify, we: (i) add an entry node Entry and
connect it to the original entry block; and, (ii) connect all exit nodes to a sink node Sink.
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6: call listen
call gai_strerror
3: call socket
call freeaddrinfo
call errno_location
call strerror
2: call getaddrinfo
call close
5: call bind
call close
4: call setsocketopt
call errno_location
call strerror
1: call memset
Figure 2: Typical call instructions for starting a
server in order of appearance in the binary code.
1: call memset
2: call getaddrinfo
3: call socket
4: call setsocketopt
5: call bind
6: call listen
Figure 3: Typical call instructions for starting a
server, in their correct call order, automatically
filtered from error handling calls. This order and
filtering could be obtained only by analyzing call
paths the Control-Flow Graph.
We wish to represent P as a set of all potential runtime call sequences, such as the ones shown in
Figure 1(d). We take all sequences of instructions along simple paths from Entry to Sink and denote
them as PathsEntry→Sink . For each path p ∈ PathsEntry→Sink , we use instructions(p) to denote
the sequence of instructions executed along p:
[P] = {instructions(p) | p ∈ PathsEntry→Sink}
We map each sequence of instructions instSeq ∈ [P] to a sequence of call sites: we take only the
“call” instructions in instSeq, e.g., call getaddrinfo, and reconstruct the argument kinds for
each such call as explained in Section 2.3: getaddrinfo(ARG,ARG,CONST,CONST).
Example Consider the “call” instructions of Figure 2. These calls are listed in the arbitrary order
they were written by the compiler, which does not reflect any logical or chronological order. The
path pi =memset→getaddrinfo→socket→setsockopt→bind→listen is interleaved with
error handling calls such as close and strerror. Additionally, the calls of this path themselves
are randomly shuffled in the assembly, i.e., listen appears before bind. By analyzing the CFG and
extracting only possible runtime paths, we approximate all potential call sequences. Figure 3 shows
how the path pi is easily reordered and filtered from other calls thanks to the graph representation.
This analysis detects also paths that end in error handling calls, i.e., memset→stderror, as these
might also be executed at runtime (if memset failed).
Finally, we represent P in the learning model as the set of all potential reconstructed call site
sequences, including paths that end in calls to error handling procedures. We let the attention
mechanism in the model select the more relevant sequences while decoding.
4 Model
The key idea in this work is to represent a binary procedure as a set of call site sequences. We follow
the general encoder-decoder paradigm (Cho et al., 2014; Sutskever et al., 2014) with attention (Luong
et al., 2015; Bahdanau et al., 2014) for sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models, with the difference
that the input is not the standard single sequence of symbols, but a set of call site sequences. We
learn a call site sequence as a sequence of encoded call sites; finally, we decode the target procedure
name word-by-word while considering a dynamic weighted average of call site vectors at each step.
We note that the main focus of our work is the novel synergy between program analysis of binaries
and neural models, rather than the specific neural architecture. To demonstrate this approach, our
model is a simple extension of attention encoder-decoder models (Luong et al., 2015; Bahdanau
et al., 2014) that encodes a set of input sequences, but the same approach can be used with more
expressive architectures.
Overview Encoder-decoder attention models map a sequence of input symbols x = (x1, ..., xn) to a
sequence of latent vector representations z = (z1, ..., zn). Given z, the decoder predicts a sequence of
output symbols y = (y1, ..., yn), thus modeling the conditional probability: p (y1, ..., ym | x1, ..., xn).
At each decoding time step, auto-regressive models predict the next symbol conditioned on the
previously predicted symbol, hence the probability of the target sequence can be factorized as:
p (y1, ..., ym | x1, ..., xn) =
m∏
j=1
p
(
yj | y< j, z1, ..., zn
)
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Figure 4: Our model encodes each call site as the subtokens in the called API and the kinds of passed
arguments; an LSTM encodes sequences of call sites; finally, the decoder uses all encoded sequences
to generate the output sequence.
We employ a similar architecture to the standard attention encoder-decoder, with the following
differences: (i) each vector in z = (z1, ..., zn) is an encoded call site sequence with its arguments;
(ii) the encoder learns a set of call site sequences, rather than a single input sequence; and (iii) there
is no positional relation between the encoded sequences z = (z1, ..., zn) = {z1, ..., zn}. We thus refer
to the representation as a set of sequences.
Call site sequence encoderWe define a vocabulary of learned embeddings Enames . This vocabulary
assigns a vector for every subtoken of API name which was observed in the training corpus. For
example, if the training corpus contains a call to open_file, each of open and file is assigned
a vector in Enames . Additionally, we define a learned embedding for each argument kind, e.g.,
ARG, VAL, CONST or GLOBAL (Section 2), and for every actual value (e.g., the number “1”) that
occurred in training data. We denote the matrix containing these vectors as Ekinds . We represent a
call site by summing the embeddings of its API subtokens, and concatenating with up to kargs of
argument kind embeddings:
encode_callsite
(
w1...wks , kind1, ..., kindkargs
)
=
[(
ks∑
i
Enameswi
)
; Ekindskind1 ; ... ; E
kinds
kindkargs
]
We pad the remaining kind slots with an additional no-arg symbol. In our experiments, we used up
to 10 arguments, i.e., kargs = 10. Next, we learn a call site sequence using a bidirectional LSTM.We
represent each call site sequence by concatenating the last states of forward and backward LSTMs:
h1, ..., hl = LSTM (callsite1, ..., callsitel)
z =
[
h→l ; h
←
l
]
Where l is the maximal length of a call site sequence. In our experiments, we used l = 60. Finally,
given a set of call site sequences, we represent the entire procedure as a set of its encoded call site
sequences: {z1, z2, ..., zn}
DecoderOur decoder operates much like decoders of contemporary auto-regressive attention models
such as Luong et al. (2015). Given a set of encoded call site sequences z = (z1, ..., zn), the decoder
predicts the next output symbol, i.e., procedure name subtoken, while attending over z. By attending
over the call site sequences z, the decoder selects the relevant call site sequences for each decoding
step. As the initial state of the decoder, we average the encoded call site sequences: hdec0 =
1
n
∑n
i=1 zi
5 Evaluation
We implemented our approach in a model called Nero, for NEural Reverse engineering Of stripped
binaries.
5.1 Experimental Setup
DatasetWe collected a dataset of executables from the GNU code repository containing a variety of
applications such as networking, administration tools and libraries. We focus our evaluation on Intel
64-bit executables running on Linux, but the same process can be applied to other architectures and
operating systems. We extracted procedure names to use as labels and then compiled and stripped
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each executable to use as the input to the model. This resulted in 13, 826 procedures which we split
into training-validation-test sets using a (8 : 1 : 1) ratio. The dataset contains 2.49 (±0.01) target
symbols per example. There are 829.38 (±13.28) assembly code tokens per procedure, which our
analysis reduces to 10.05 (±0.08) call sites and 12.6 (±0.23) paths per procedure1; the average path
is 7.5 (±0.01) call sites long. We make this dataset publicly available.
To avoid dealing with mixed naming schemes, we removed all packages containing a mix of pro-
gramming languages, e.g., a Python package containing partial C implementations. We filtered out
wrapper procedures because they are usually very easy to both reverse-engineer and predict, thus
falsely improve the scores.
Avoiding Duplicates Following Lopes et al. (2017) and Allamanis (2018) who pointed out the
existence of code duplication in open-source datasets and its adverse effects, we created the train,
validation, and test sets from completely separate projects and packages. Additionally, we put a lot
of effort, both manual and automatic, into filtering duplicates from our dataset. To filter duplicates,
we filtered out the following:
1. Different versions of the same package – for example, “wget-1.7” and “wget-1.20”.
2. C++ code – C++ code regularly contains overloaded procedures; further, class methods
start with the class name as a prefix. To avoid duplication and name leakage, we filtered out
all C++ executables entirely.
3. Tests – all executables suspected as being tests or examples were filtered out.
4. Static linking – we took only packages that could compile without static linking. This
ensures that dependencies are not compiled into the dependent executable.
Training We trained our model using a single Tesla V100 GPU. Training the model is relatively
efficient: each example in a batch contains multiple call site sequences, and all sequences of all
examples in the batch can be learned in parallel. We used embeddings of size 128 for target
subtokens and API subtokens; to encode call site sequences we use bidirectional LSTMS with 128
units each; the decoder LSTM had 512 units. We used dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) of 0.5 on the
API embeddings and the LSTMs. We used the Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) optimization algorithm.
We trained the network end-to-end using the cross-entropy loss. We tuned hyperparameters on the
validation set, and evaluated the final model on the test set.
MetricsAt test and validation time, we adopted the measure used by previous work (Allamanis et al.,
2016; Alon et al., 2019a; Fernandes et al., 2019), and measured precision, recall and F1 score over
the target subtokens, case insensitive and ignoring non-alphabetical characters. For example, for a
true reference of open file: a prediction of open is given full precision and 50% recall; and a
prediction of open input file is given 67% precision and full recall.
Baselines We compare our model to Debin (He et al., 2018), by training and testing their model on
our dataset2. This is a non-neural baseline based on Conditional Random Fields (CRFs). As far
as we are aware, this is the only other work attempting to perform a similar task to ours. We note
that Debin was designed for a slightly different task of predicting names for both local variables and
procedure names; nevertheless, we focus on the more difficult task of predicting procedure names
and use only these to compute their score. Other straightforward baselines are Transformer-text and
LSTM-text in which we do not perform any program analysis, and instead just apply standard NMT
architectures directly on the assembly code: one is the Transformer (Vaswani et al., 2017), and the
other has two bidirectional LSTMs as the encoder, two decoder layers and attention. To evaluate the
main novelties of our approach, which are learning from enriched APIs and learning Control-Flow
paths – we perform a thorough ablation study, as detailed in Section 5.3.
5.2 Results
Table 1 shows the results of the comparison to He et al. (2018), LSTM-text, and Transformer-text.
Overall, our model shows a 20% relative improvement over the model of He et al. (2018) and 86%
over LSTM-text. Our model performs best on both precision and recall.
1The average number of paths (12.6) is greater than the average number of call sites (10.05) because each
call site may participates in multiple possible call sequences in the CFG.
2The dataset of He et al. (2018) is not publicly available. We make our dataset public.
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Model Prec Rec F1
Debin (He et al., 2018) 34.86 32.54 33.66
LSTM-text 22.32 21.16 21.72
Transformer-text 11.33 10.27 10.77
Nero (this work) 45.82 36.40 40.57
Table 1: Our model outperforms previous
work by a relative improvement of 20%.
Model Prec Rec F1
Nero no-kinds 43.62 35.25 38.99
BiLSTM call-sites 36.05 31.77 33.77
BiLSTM calls 35.95 30.36 32.92
Nero (this work) 45.82 36.40 40.57
Table 2: Variations on our model, ablating
components of our analysis.
Comparison to He et al. (2018) Conceptually, our model is much more powerful because it is able to
decode out-of-vocabulary procedure names from subtokens, while the CRF of He et al. (2018) uses a
closed vocabulary that can only predict already-seen procedure names. At the binary code side, since
our model is neural, at test time it can utilize unseen call site sequences while their CRF can only
use observed relationships between elements. Furthermore, their representation performs a shallow
translation from binary instruction to connections between symbols, while our representation is based
on a deeper data-flow-based analysis to find values of registers arguments of imported procedures.
Comparison to LSTM-text and Transformer-text The comparison to the NMT baselines shows that
learning directly from the assembly code performs significantly worse than leveraging semantic
knowledge and static analysis of binaries. We hypothesize that the reasons are the high variability
in the assembly data, which results in a low signal-to-noise ratio. This comparison necessitates the
need of an informative static analysis to represent and learn from executables.
The superiority of LSTM-text over Transformer-text for code is consistent with Fernandes et al.
(2019) and Alon et al. (2019a) in C# and Java. We hypothesize that the main factors are: (i) the
extremely long source sequences (829 on average in our assembly dataset) produced when reading
assembly code as a flat text, which are highly unusual in NMT; and (ii) the large amount of source
symbol repetition within each sequence: in our case, instructions and registers such as mov and eax,
which might noise the self-attention mechanism of Transformers.
Examples Table 3 shows a few examples for predictions made by the different models. Additional
examples can be found in the supplementary material.
5.3 Ablation study
To evaluate the contribution of our representation, we compare our model to the following configu-
rations:
1. Nero no kinds - uses only the CFG analysis with the called API names, without argument
kinds.
2. BiLSTM call-sites - uses the same enriched call sites representation as our model including
argument kinds, with the main difference that the order of the call sites is their order in the
assembly code: there is no analysis of the CFG.
3. BiLSTM calls - does not use CFG analysis neither argument kinds. Instead, it uses two
layers of bidirectional LSTMs with attention to encode call instructions with only the
name of the called procedure, in the order they appear in the executable.
Table 2 shows the performance of the different configurations. Nero achieves relatively 4% higher
score than Nero no-kinds. This shows the contribution of the information stored in argument kinds
and its importance to prediction. BiLSTM call-sites and BiLSTM calls relatively trail 16% and
19% behind Nero . These show the importance of our data-flow-based observation of the data. As
we discuss in Section 3, our data-flow-based analysis helps filtering and reordering calls in their
approximate chronological runtime order, rather than the arbitrary order of calls as they appear in
the assembly code. BiLSTM call-sites performs slightly better than BiLSTM calls due to the use of
argument kinds instead of plain call instructions.
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Model Prediction
Gold read file check new watcher get user groups install signal handlers
He et al. (2018) bt open read index display signal setup
LSTM-text <unk> check opt close stdin <unk>
Transformer-text ipmi disable coredump <unk> config file ipmi regfree
Nero (this work) vfs read file check file get ip groups install handlers
Table 3: Examples from our test set and predictions made by the different models. More examples
can be found in the supplementary material.
6 Related Work
Machine learning for source code Several works have investigated machine learning approaches for
predicting names in high-level languages. Most works focused on variable names (Alon et al., 2018;
Bavishi et al., 2018), method names (Allamanis et al., 2016; Alon et al., 2019b; Allamanis et al.,
2015) or general properties of code (Raychev et al., 2016b, 2014). Another interesting application
is measuring the likelihood of existing names to detect naming bugs (Pradel and Sen, 2018; Rice
et al., 2017). Most work in this field used either syntax only (Bielik et al., 2016; Raychev et al.,
2016a; Maddison and Tarlow, 2014), semantic analysis (Allamanis et al., 2018) or both (Raychev
et al., 2015; Iyer et al., 2018). Leveraging syntax only may be useful in languages such as Java and
JavaScript that have a rich syntax, which is not available in our difficult scenario of RE of binaries.
In contrast with syntactic-only work such as Alon et al. (2019a,b), working with binaries requires a
deeper semantic analysis in the spirit of Allamanis et al. (2018), which recovers sufficient information
for training the model using semantic analysis.
Allamanis et al. (2018), Brockschmidt et al. (2019) and Fernandes et al. (2019) further leveraged
semantic analysis with Graph Neural Networks, where edges in the graph were relations found using
syntactic and semantic analysis. In our approach, there is no need to manually define rules for
building the graph as in Allamanis et al. (2018) because we learn from the Control-Flow Graph.
Another work (DeFreez et al., 2018) learned embeddings for C functions based on the CFG. We
also use the CFG, but in the more difficult domain of stripped compiled binaries rather than C code.
Static analysis models for RE He et al. (2018) used static analysis with CRFs to predict various
properties in binaries. As we show in Section 5, our model gains 20% higher scores due to their
sparse model and our deeper data-flow analysis . Katz et al. (2018) showed an approach to infer
subclass-superclass relations in stripped binaries. Lee et al. (2011) used static and dynamic analysis
to recover high-level types. In contrast, our approach is purely static. Shin et al. (2015) used RNNs
to identify procedure boundaries inside a stripped binary. David et al. (2017) and Pewny et al. (2015)
addressed the problem of finding similar procedures to a given procedure or executable, which is
useful to detect vulnerabilities.
7 Conclusion
We present a novel approach for predicting procedure names in stripped binaries. The core idea is
to leverage static analysis of binaries to encode rich representations of API call sites; traverse the
Control-Flow Graph to approximate the chronological runtime order of the call sites; and encode
these sequences using a set-of-seq-to-seq architecture tailored to leverage this representation.
We evaluated our framework over real-world stripped procedures. Our model achieves F1 score
of 40.57 in predicting procedure names, which is a 20% relative gain over existing non-neural ap-
proaches, and over 86% relative gain over the naïve textual baselines (“LSTM-text” and “Transformer-
text”). Our ablation study shows the importance of analyzing argument kinds and learning from
the CFG. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to leverage deep learning for reverse
engineering procedure names in binary code.
We believe that the principles presented in this paper can serve as a basis for a wide range of tasks
that involve learning models and RE, such as malware and ransomware detection, executable search,
and neural decompilation. To this end, we make our dataset and trained models publicly available.
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8 Additional Examples
Table 4 contains more examples from our test set, along with the predictions made by our model and
each of the baselines.
Gold He et al. (2018) LSTM-text Transformer-text BiLSTM call-sites Nero (this work)
mktime from utc nettle pss ... get boundary <unk> str file mktime
read buffer concat fopen safer mh print fmtspec net read filter read
get widech get byte user mh decode rcpt flag <unk> do tolower
get user groups display close stdin config file ipmi get user groups get ip groups
ftp parse winnt ls uuconf iv ... mktime print status send to file parse form
write init pos allocate pic buf open int <unk> print type cfg init
wait for proc wait subprocess start open mh print fmtspec <unk> strip
read string cmp error check command process io read
get user groups mh alias enumerate hol free fi hostlist string is group groups get user groups
find env find env pos proper name utf close stream read token find env
write calc jacob usage msg update pattern print one paragraph <unk> write
write calc outputs fsquery show debug section cwd advance fd <unk> write
get script line get line make dir hier <unk> read ps line jconfig get
getuser readline stdin read readline rushdb print mh decode rcpt flag write line readline read
set max db age do link set owner make dir hier sparse copy set
write calc deriv orthodox hdy ds symbol close stream fprint entry write type
read file bt open <unk> ... disable coredump <unk> vfs read file
parse options parse options finish mh print fmtspec get options parse args
url free hash rehash hostname destroy setupvariables hol free free dfa content
check new watcher read index check opt <unk> open source check file
open input file get options query in ck rename set delete input
install signal handlers signal setup <unk> regfree <unk> install handlers
write calc jacob put in fp table save game var hostname destroy <unk> write
filename pattern free add char segment free dfa content hostname destroy glob cleanup free exclude segment
read line tartime init all close stdout parse args read
locate unset var is unset url get arg regerror var is var is unset
ftp parse unix ls serv select fn canonicalize <unk> <unk> parse syntax option
free netrc gea compile hostname destroy hostname destroy free ent hol free
string to bool string to bool setnonblock mh decode rcpt flag string to bool parse check line or field
Table 4: Examples from our test set and predictions made by the different models.
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